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Individuality
The Emersonian Background of the Bergson-James Controversy
Anna M. Nieddu
1 The peculiarity of the relation between William James and Henri Bergson is connected to
the deep differences of their philosophical outcomes. Really, it looks unusual that the two
philosophers – both started from an idea of temporality of conscience so similar to be
practically interchangeable – reach a conclusion at last, in many respects, diametrically
opposite.1
2 Also the history of the relationship James-Bergson, as it can be reconstructed through
letters and testimonies of various kinds, appears confused and uneven.
3 In a letter to Th. Ribot dated July 10th 1905, Bergson refers to an article appeared in the
Revue Philosophique; in this article, Gaston Rageot affirmed that in his composition of the
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, the French philosopher would have been
influenced by the psychologies of James Ward and William James: France would have
borrowed a psychology from United States to give back a philosophy.2
4 Bergson defends the full originality of his position affirming not to have had knowledge of
J. Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism to the time when he was engaged to compose the Essai
sur les données immédiates de la conscience and only to have read the item written by Ward
on the British Encyclopedia. With the same resolution, Bergson affirms not to have known
of the same epoch in the article published in 1884 on Mind by W. James.3 But, really, this
article  also,  broadly  used  by  W. James  for  the  drawing  up  of  the  IX  chapter  of  The
Principles of Psychology,4 bears witness to the fact that W. James had elaborated the basis of
his psychological theory well before (i.e. five years before) Bergson had published his
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. On the contrary, Bergson writes to Ribot
that James truly was “un philosophe dont je ne dirai jamais assez combien je l’aime et je l’admire,
” but unequivocal chronological reasons would forbid us to think about the possibility
that the idea of stream of consciousness could have represented somehow a model for the
durée réelle.
5 According to Bergson, undeniably some analogies among the two ideas concerning the
dynamics of consciousness exist and they are evident; nevertheless – writes the French
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philosopher – we can see that they: “n’ont pas la même signification et ne peuvent se rattacher
à la même origine.”5 The stream of consciousness has a psychological origin; the durée réelle,
instead,  draws  its  origin  in  the  criticism  of  homogeneous  time,  as  expressed  in
mathematics.6 It exists among the two philosophies – Bergson will still say – a sort of
“prestablished harmony,” but not an identity,7 and the different origins of the notions of
stream of consciousness and durée réelle give reason for their different functions too. As we
have seen, for the French philosopher the true reason that really fits to expound certain
analogies is to be sought in the general climate of an epoch, tense to the realization of a
model  of  philosophical  thought  more  concretely  “tied  to  life.”8 A  few days  later  his
answer to Ribot, Bergson wrote a letter to James in which he supports that the fact that
pragmatism and spiritualism appear so close in their criticism to the concept of spatial
time denotes that the two philosophies are: “l’une et l’autre dans le voisinage de la vérité.”9
According to the French philosopher,  Jamesian pluralism and Bergsonian spiritualism
represent two answers different but complementary to the same demand; that is to say,
the two answers both represent the need to transfer the metaphysics on a plan of vital
concreteness after having shown the modalities by which the inner experiencing of human
beings happens.
6 So, it could appear out of place to attest to an immediate deviation from James’ thought in
Bergson’s philosophy – or also a simple determinable ancestry – to make affirmations in
the opposite sense. Nevertheless, the representation of the life of human consciousness in
the  form of  a  “stream”  and the  qualification of  inner  time as  “durée”  appear  tightly
interconnected and, finally, both are finalized to the determination of a new and concrete
metaphysics, in comparison to every kind of ontological hypostatization.10
7 In the relationship between Bergson and James an articulated and rich literature exists,
contemporary to the two philosophers and following11 that has the worth to point out the
‘unusual coincidence’ to which we reported up until this point. It will not be assumed, in
this  occasion,  the  assignment  to  add  new  remarks  inside  this  explored  debate;  the
differences between the origins and the subsequent theoretical developments of the two
philosophies, in fact, are evident.
8 The present work moves from the belief that the analysis of the relationship among the
two philosophers must also follow other runs. The deep-rooted similarity of the ideas of
stream of consciousness and durée réelle – similarity for the contents and not for what may
concern their origin and function, as Bergson had sustained – represents, in fact, only a
macroscopic aspect of the problem. The idea of a qualitative notion of temporality, indeed,
opens the doors to a concept of human beings in which the value awarded to the notions
of  novelty  and individuality  plays  a  decisive  role,  opening  the  way  to  a  new form of
universalism of values and normative ideals: a concrete and personalistic universalism.
9 Stream of consciousness, as well as durée réelle, points out the essential feature of human
“nature” and gives rise to notable developments in the field of ethics, both in respect to
inherent problems concerning the formation of the self and in the relationship among its
dynamics, both in respect to the theorization of the role of novelty exerted by “great men”
or “great moral personalities” in Bergson’s terms.12 The strong assonance between the
French philosopher and William James is to be put in a place of prominence also in this
case and can be interesting to investigate its origin.
10 In this paper, I assume that the topic of individuality, and the very similar way in which
the two philosophers theorized its temporalistic and pluralistic constitution, is the field in
which it is possible to locate their common referring to Ralph W. Emerson.13 Both of them
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have been deeply influenced by Emerson’s thought, even though in different measure and
sometimes with different, if not diverging, philosophical results. Nevertheless, just the
peculiarity of this common inspiration can contribute to a better understanding of their
controversial relation and of the consequences of this relation on the development of
James’ ethics.14
11 Also on the basis of the evidences that it is possible to draw from Bergson’ statements, his
contact with Emerson took roots far away, perhaps at the same time in which William
James, on his side, became familiar with the Trascendentalism through his father’s teach
ing. In this way, Bergson’s admiration of William James appears subsequent and, in a cer
tain measure, consequential to that of Emerson:
When I allude to American idealism – Bergson maintains in a discourse held to the
Société  France-Amerique  of  New  York  –  I  do  not  mean  merely  philosophical
idealism, although that philosophical idealism is what drew me towards America
many years ago, when I was almost a boy; I  loved Emerson,  and later I  became a
devoted friend and admirer  of  one  of  your  greatest  minds,  one  of  the  greatest
philosophers of his time and probably of all times, William James.15
12 In 1936, in a letter addressed to J. Chevalier, Bergson still writes that it is well-suited to
James Emerson’s definition of personality: “une réserve de force qui agit par sa seule présence.
”16 Few years before, indeed – giving in Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion his own
definition of  “great  moral  personality”17 –  Bergson had shown he re-  membered the
lesson of an attention given to the individual and the new coming not so much from the
European romantic tradition, but rather from the American philosophy of the preceding
century.18 Also Bergson’s positions seem to completely agree with the spirit dominating
the young American philosophy. A spirit for which the term strength must be understood
in a personalistic way, that is, like character, according to Emerson: a fruitful human energy
that qualifies the single contexts in which it is inserted, identifying them.19
13 This appears to be also the case of some expressions that James had devoted to the figure
of Emerson:
Emerson’s belief that the individual must in reason be adequate to the vocation for
which the Spirit  of  the world  has  called him into being,  is  the source  of  those
sublime  pages,  hearteners,  and  sustainers  of  our  youth,  in  which  he  urges  his
hearers to be incorruptibly true to their own private conscience. Nothing can harm
the  man  who  rests  in  his  appointed  place  and  character.  Such  a  man  is
invulnerable; he balances the universe, balances it as much by keeping small when
he is small, by being great and spreading when he is great. […] The vanity of all
superserviceableness  and  pretence  was  never  more  happily  set  forth  than  by
Emerson in the many passages in which he develops this aspect of his philosophy.
Character infallibly proclaims itself.20
14 The deep trust in the ethical value of the inventive actions and capabilities of individuals
assumes such a particular meaning in the context of an epoch that – in Europe as well as
in America – had assisted and it still assisted in the birth of aberrant productions from a
distorted  environmentalism,  like  that  proposed  by  the  various  currents  of  Social
Darwinism. Bergson and James make a common way in their attempt to free the human
action  from  every  form  of  determinism,  emancipating  the  individuals.  On  the
philosophical plane, this ethical aim finds correspondence in the acknowledgement and
the statement of the value of individuality.
15 In Bergson, from the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience to Les deux sources de la
morale et de la religion, the grounding principle of individuality and the great theme of
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freedom develop together and at the same time. Individuality and free will, understood
like original expressivity of subjectivity, mark the peculiar character of human beings:
L’associationiste – Bergson writes in his essay of 1889 – réduit le moi à un agrégat
de faits de conscience, sensations, sentiments et idées. Mais s’il ne voit dans ces
divers états rien de plus que ce que leur nom exprime, s’il n’en retient que l’aspect
impersonnel, il pourra les juxtaposer indéfiniment sans obtenir autre chose qu’un
moi fantôme, l’ombre du moi se projetant dans l’espace.  Que si,  au contraire,  il
prend ces états psychologiques avec la coloration particulière qu’ils revêtent chez
une personne déterminée et qui leur vient à chacun du reflet de tous les autres,
alors point n’est besoin d’associer plusieurs faits de conscience pour reconstituer la
personne:  elle  est  tout  entière dans un seul  d’entre eux,  pourvu qu’on sache le
choisir. Et la manifestation extérieure de cet état interne sera précisément ce qu’on
appelle un acte libre, puisque le moi seul en aura été l’auteur, puisqu’elle exprimera
le moi tout entier.21
16 In Bergson’s thought, the authentic freedom is expression of the whole personality and,
therefore, more difficult to achieve. Owing to a misunderstood and superficial education,
in fact, a parasitical I overlaps the authentic one, the I that Bergson calls moi fondamental.
Weak suggestions coming from the I cannot make their way and remain in a latent state
without becoming a motive of conduct.
17 In that state, free will cannot be attested:
Beaucoup  vivent  ainsi  et  meurent  sans  avoir  connu  la  vraie  liberté.  Mais  la
suggestion  deviendrait  persuasion  si  le  moi  tout  entier  se  l’assimilait  […]  toute
l’histoire de la personne: et l’éducation la plus autoritaire ne retrancherait rien de
notre  liberté  si  elle  nous  communiquait  seulement  des  idées  et  des  sentiments
capables d’imprégner l’âme entière.22
18 At last, the free action coincides with the re-conquest of self by the subject; a re-conquest
that is realized when the subject can reconnect itself to the pure durée. In this respect, no
one better than the artist is able to achieve a direct contact with the deep passions that
animate the human spirit:
Bref, nous sommes libres quand nos actes émanent de notre personnalité entière,
quand ils  l’expriment,  quand ils  ont  avec  elle  cette  indéfinissable  ressemblance
qu’on trouve parfois entre l’œuvre et l’artiste.23
19 The references to the creativeness of the artist enrich of new articulations the relation-
ship between individuality and freedom. Sources of freedom, in the well-known Bergson’s
expressions  that  we  have  recalled,  might  well  represent  the  thread  of  all  the
philosophical  search  of  the  French  thinker.  In  the  Essai  of  1889,  the  free  act  is  a
spontaneous one since the temporality of experience is durée; the free act, in fact, is one 
and indivisible like the temporal continuum which belongs to the life of the conscience.
Intellect is incapable to formulate a notion of time that does not denaturalize the sense
and the reality of it, making it a pure mental construction.
20 Intellect is not able, as well, to define freedom since the free act, as spontaneity, is really
indecipherable. The authentic freedom can be only immediately picked up:
Nous  pouvons  maintenant  formuler  notre  conception  de  la  liberté.  On  appelle
liberté  le  rapport  du  moi  concret  à  l’acte  qu’il  accomplit.  Ce  rapport  est
indéfinissable,  précisément  parce  que  nous  sommes  libres.  […]  comme  on  a
commencé par figer en quelque sorte l’activité du moi, on voit la spontanéité se
résoudre en inertie et la liberté en nécessité.24
21 The  inside  development  of  his  views  on  freedom will  conduct  the  philosopher  to  a
different attitude towards the social implications of human action; the theses of the Essai 
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hide, in fact, a difficulty hard to exceed. The definition of free will as spontaneity and the
refined  indeterminateness  of  the  affirmations  of  the  philosopher  had  aroused  an
immediate critical reaction in whoever – like Levy-Bruhl and G. Belot – saw a real attack
to the intellectual capabilities of man in Bergson’s idea.25
22 In Matière et mémoire, Bergson already warned the non negligible sense of such criticisms
and tried to isolate his own position from the “indeterminist field,” influenced by the
psychology of  Janet,  putting  it  on  the  place  of  a  new  horizon.26 Inside  this  new
perspective, it would be possible a reconciliation among the purely sensitive and animal 
element of spontaneity and the reflexive one; the element that better characterizes the
human approach to the reality:
Chez l’homme, être pensant, l’acte libre peut s’appeler une synthèse de sentiments
et d’idées, et l’évolution qui y conduit une évolution raisonnable. La durée où nous
nous regardons agir, et où il est utile que nous nous regardions, est une durée dont
les éléments se dissocient et se juxtaposent; mais la durée où nous agissons est une
durée où nos états se fondent les uns dans les autres, et c’est là que nous devons
faire effort pour nous replacer par la pensée dans le cas exceptionnel et unique où
nous spéculons sur la nature intime de l’action, c’est-à-dire dans la théorie de la
liberté.27
23 In this passage, Bergson alludes, even if still vaguely, to the possibility of a third way,
among instinct and intelligence; a way that will find expression in L’évolution créatrice.28 In
the 1907 work,  in fact,  Bergson gives  evidence of  the incapability  of  the intellect  to
furnish impulses to the will: the behavior of the human being can be solicited only by
suggestions  of  emotional  nature.  Therefore,  liberty  appears  as  an  expression  of
sensitiveness and not of intelligence and for this motive will be difficult to achieve it until
human conduct is tied to the habits of the group:
Au contraire, une conduite vraiment nôtre est celle d’une volonté qui ne cherche
pas  à  contrefaire  l’intelligence  et qui,  restant  elle-même  c’est-à-dire  évoluant,
aboutit  par  voie  de  maturation  graduelle  à  des  actes  que  l’intelligence  pourra
résoudre indéfiniment en éléments intelligible sans y arriver jamais complètement:
l’acte libre est incommensurable avec l’idée, et sa “rationalité” doit se définir par
cette  incommensurabilité  même,  qui  permet  d’y  trouver  autant  d’intelligibilité
qu’on voudra. Tel est le caractère de notre évolution intérieure. Et tel est aussi, sans
doute, celui de l’évolution de la vie.29
24 Despite Bergson’s new theory of free will proceeded toward a definite way, difficulties,
criticisms and lacks of understanding of various kinds denote how much the psychology
of the Essai was considered insufficient and inadequate on the scientific and experimental
plan. On more than one occasion during animated discussions in the Société Française de
Philosophie, G. Belot showed the great weaknesses of the Essai sur les données de la conscience
to those who appeared to him. Bergson’s appeal for the foundation of a method finalized
to the establishment of a new metaphysics, according to the author of the Études de morale
positive,  hides a substantial indeterminateness of contents,  as well as almost the total
absence of experimental results. According to the French moralist, Bergson introduced
the analysis of the soul-body relationship in the Essai and developed it in following works,
but without a real conclusion.30 Going to the problems more directly connected to human
conduct, Belot holds that difficulties considerably increase; a theory that constitutes the
in-  dividual  soul  in  an  entity  separated  by  the  body,  in  fact,  leads  to  an  analogous
separation of the individuals between them:
Même indécision enfin au point de vue moral. Tendre à isoler l’esprit du corps, c’est
toujours tendre aussi à isoler les esprits les uns des autres; l’histoire de la pensée morale
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confirmerait, ce me semble, cet apparent paradoxe, et en tout cas les doctrines de
M. Bergson comportement très manifestement l’aveu de la solidarité de ceux idées.
31
25 To these observations Bergson, simply and quietly, responded:
Que vous dirais-je de plus? Et comment, sur cette philosophie encore vague de la
vie,  pourrais-je  édifier  la  morale  précise  et  définitive  que  vous  paraissez  me
demander?32
26 In 1932, when Bergson finally sent the book concerning his interpretation of the facts of
morals to press, some leading aspects of his thought had also suffered modifications of a
certain  degree,  owing  to  the  influence  of  a  changed  cultural  climate  in  social-
anthropological studies.33 In Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, after Bergson took
the conscience of the social dimension of individual action, a new concept of community
and a different way of handing towards this by the individual came out. The progressive
sunset of  Positivism made different hypotheses which were related to the social  fact
practicable and allowed them to refer to the problems regarding the life of collectivity
without having to make concessions to mechanistic positions. The pragmatism of James
contributes also to the attainment of  these finalities and to the foundation of  a new
cultural climate as well as to a belated return to the psychological functionalism on which
this had been founded.
27 In introducing his Hibbert Lecture on Bergson and the criticism of the intellectualism,
James in 1909 so expressed himself:
Neither one of Taine’s famous principles of explanation of great men, the race, the
environment, or the moment, no, nor all three together, will explain that peculiar way
of looking at things that constitutes his mental individuality.  Originality in men
dates from nothing previous, other things date from it, rather.34
28 It  is  unusual  to see how James attributes the same acknowledgement that he steadily
addressed to  Emerson to  Bergson;  that  is,  the  worth to  have theorized the  value of
individuality and novelty, concerned as that inside capability of every individual to produce
creative actions; the same kind of creative actions that can be identified in the actions of
the so-called “great men.” According to James, we owe to Bergson the appraisal of the
notion of individuality as expression of novelty and authentic freedom; that appraisal that
the French philosopher – even though in a vague way – assigns to his own Emersonian
source. Bergson – James still affirms – “cancels the intellectualistic veto” and, making so,
produces a self-sufficient philosophical conscience. What intellectualism do, in fact: “is to
harness up reality in our conceptual systems in order to drive it better.”35
29 Intellectual processes pursue finalities of practical order; they are not able to justify the
triumphalism that  science  displays  in  its  steady conviction to  be  able  to  gather  the
objectivity of the natural phenomena at all times. James – that does not completely share
the Bergonian ‘anti-deterministic’ thesis applied to science – limits himself to embank the
‘philosophical’ pretensions of a certain way to plan the problems:
I  am  quite  willing  to  part  company  with  Professor  Bergson,  and  to  ascribe  a
primarily  theoretical  function  to  our  intellect,  provided  you on  your  part  then
agree  to  discriminate  “theoretic”  or  scientific  knowledge  from  the  deeper
“speculative”  knowledge  aspired  to  by  most  philosophers,  and  concede  that
theoretic knowledge, which is knowledge about things, as distinguished from living
or sympathetic acquaintance with them, touches only the outer surface of reality.36
30 According to James,  from a speculative point  of  view it  is  valid to assume Bergson’s
presupposition  for  which  intellect  can  not  gather  the  reality  in  its  fullness  and
Individuality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
6
concreteness.  The  discussion  related  to  the  theoretical  or  practical  function  of  the
concepts could really be brought to an endless controversy, since – James observes – the
way in which the problem is posed is not correct. As a matter of fact, it does not admit the
possibility of a cohabitation among scientific and philosophical knowledge and between
empiricism  and  philosophy  of  intuition.  We  must  not  confuse  different  fields  of
pertinence and different abilities of penetration: “Direct acquaintance and conceptual
knowledge are thus complementary of each other; each remedies the other’s defects.”37
31 However,  the  deep  substratum  of  the  phenomena  can  be  gathered  through  sudden
contacts of sympathetic nature, through the intuition:
The sole thing that is certain in the midst of it all is that Bergson is absolutely right
in contending that the whole life of activity and change is inwardly impenetrable to
conceptual treatment, and that it opens itself only to sympathetic apprehension at
the  hands  of  immediate  feelings.  All  the  what’s  as  well  as  the  that’s  of  reality,
relational  as  well  as  terminal,  are  in  the  end  contents  of  immediate  concrete
perception.38
32 The  point  of  substantial  accord  between  James  and  Bergson  seems  to  reside  in  a
conception of the reality in form of a process, such not to allow the intellect to unfold its
own logical nature. With propositions and accents that immediately call to the memory
Bergson’s  Matière  et  Mémoire,  the  American  philosopher  confirms  the  concept  of  a
becoming reality, that: “falls in passing into conceptual analysis; it mounts in living its own
undivided life.”39 So, the assignments of science and philosophy are separate, above all
when this last desires to strengthen the aspirations of an empiricism that is really such,
integral and lived:
Philosophy  should  seek  this  kind  of  living  understanding  of  the  movement  of
reality, not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results.
40
33 Therefore, James’ aspiration of the last years, tightened to the formulation of a reliable 
notion of  truth –  that  is,  a  notion capable  to  guard against  the risks  implied by an
excessive  relativism  –  is  set  inside  an  ampler  problematic  horizon,  facing  the
identification of a specific field of pertinence for the philosophical problems. It seems
plausible to recognize in this kind of aspiration the real convergence of concerns among
the two philosophers and the fundamental reason for the approach of James to Bergson,
an  approach  sometimes  unwitting,  or  forgetful,  of  the  common referring  to  a  same
source.
34 The quest of an ideal of truth so constituted inevitably implied the recognition of the
grounding  value  of  individuality  and,  in  a  specific  way,  it  sent  again  to  the  ethical
implications of that same principle. Both the thinkers agree on the presupposition that is
creativity the peculiarity of the individual action. This creativity produces ‘truth’ and
realizes itself in the immediate contact of the subject with the deepest reality. On the
concept of truth it nests one of ambiguities of the thought of the American pragmatist: in
the essays that compose his 1909 work, generally, finds expression James’ demand about
the foundation of a valid principle of truth; a principle that, at the same time, could be
able  to  respect  the  pluralist  ground  of  his  new  metaphysics.  This  demand  –
acknowledged, as it is known, also through Renouvier41 – in the pluralistic universalism of
James  was  connected  to  that  tenacious,  consequential,  substratum  deriving  from  the
education  received  by  his  father  in  a  climate  strongly  engraved  by  Emersonian
Transcendentalism. Until then, anybody better than Emerson had shown the way to the
possibility  of  a  fruitful  cohabitation  of  monistic  and  pluralistic  instances:  nature  and
Individuality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
7
individuals, universalism and free expression of an indefinite and indefinable number of
faiths and values.
35 But to gather the roots of that sort of leading ambiguity, it is opportune to remember
some pages of The moral philosopher and the moral life. In this meaningful essay, appeared in
1891,  we assist  to the attempt of the philosopher to introduce his own views on the
assignments and on the methodologies of the moral science in a ‘scientific’ form. What
James  wants  to  examine  more  precisely  is the  peculiarity  of  the  relationship  of  the
philosopher with ethical acting. But just on the term action stands a certain ambiguity of
the writing.
36 The fundamental aim of the essay immediately comes declared by James:
The main purpose of this paper is to show that there is no such thing possible as an
ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. We all help to determine the
content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life. In
other words, there can be no final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until
the last man has had his experience and said his say.42
37 In the analysis of ethical action, physical science and moral science have the common
objective to achieve results of generalizable value through the application of a method
founded upon the experience. Under this aspect, the methodological plants of physical
science and moral science sink the roots into the same substratum, anti-substantialist
and anti-absolutist:
On the whole, then, we must conclude that no philosophy of ethics is possible in the
old-fashioned absolute sense of the term. Everywhere the ethical philosopher must
wait on facts.43
38 The moral philosopher works like an arbiter inside the variegated plurality of human
faiths and beliefs to propose the more representative ideal in form of a model. Doing this
work, the moral philosopher adopts a type of investigation that does not differ, in the
method, from that of the natural scientist, but differs from it deeply for which concerns
the subject.44
39 Feelings and beliefs represent psychological acts, expressions of the intimate nature of
the human mind that only the intuitive processes gather in their deeper variety. Exalting
a thread of ethical search that unites him to Bergson, James expresses with vigor his own
recognition towards intuitionism:
Our ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all explicable as signifying
corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains to be escaped. And for having so
constantly  perceived  this  psychological  fact,  we  must  applaud  the  intuitionist
school.45
40 Ethical  actions are not material  objects,  neither mere representations of the physical
datum:  they  are  countersigned  for  being  original  creations  of  the  subject.  With
expressions that seem to anticipate the future developments of Bergson’s ethics,  and
bringing besides the implications of an analysis introduced in1880, in Great Men and Their
Environment,46 he stress the importance of the proposals that arise from great men and
from their originality:
Every now and then, however, some one is born with the right to be original, and
his revolutionary thought or action may bear prosperous fruit. He may replace old
“laws of nature” by better ones; he may, by breaking old moral rules in a certain
place, bring in a total condition of things more ideal than would have followed had
the rules been kept.47
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41 In the originality, not artfully hunted, and sometimes ‘inevitable,’ resides the possibility
to get radical changes of the object of our faith and consequent innovations of the
behavior. Although James was both convinced that only in the inner life of the individual
the  decisive  word lodges,48 he  also  so  that  faith  makes  possible  the  progress  of  the
humanity toward the best outcomes thanks to the fact that believing in God allows to
formulate an unified systematic ethic and that every religious cause frees the individual
courage.49 Whereas  logic  is  incapable  to  formulate  explanations  of  the  action,  the
mysticism intervenes.
42 In that same years, in The Sentiment of Rationality, James wrote:
The  peace  of  rationality  may  be  sought  through  ecstasy when  logic  fails.  To
religious persons of every shade of doctrine moments come when the world, as it is,
seems so divinely orderly,  and the acceptance of  it  by the heart  so rapturously
complete, that intellectual questions vanish; nay, the intellect itself is hushed to
sleep. […] Even the least religious of men must have felt with Walt Whitman, when
loafing on the grass on some transparent summer morning, that “swiftly arose and
spread  round  him  the  peace  and  knowledge  that  pass  all  the  argument  of  the
earth.”50
43 The “mystical method,” inspired by the heart, encircles the mystery without being able to
penetrate it, James will still write; the not systematic nature of such method represents in
fact its substantial weakness:
if  men  should  agree  that  the  mystical  method  is  a  subterfuge  without  logical
pertinency,  a  plaster but no cure,  and that the idea of  non-entity can never be
exorcised, empiricism will be the ultimate philosophy.51
44 In this way: 
[…] wonderfulness or mysteriousness will be an essential attribute of the nature of
things, and the exhibition and emphasizing of it will continue to be an ingredient in
the  philosophic  industry  of  the  race.  Every  generation  will  produce  its  Job,  its
Hamlet, its Faust, or its Sartor Resartus.52
45 The changed accents in comparison to the 1880 essay are clear: the appeal to a mystical
method that, according to James, would allow us to reach an authentic and complete
empiricism, brings us well  over specifically anti-Spencerian assumptions expressed in
Great men and Their Environment. In this last writing, in fact, the appearance of great men
was  explained  as  a  spontaneous  variation,  to  the  way  of  the  Darwinian  theory  of
evolution;  therefore,  the  assignment  of  the  philosopher  was  to  examine  the  mutual
relationship between the environment and the personalities so constituted. The following
developments  of  Pragmatism,  in  particular  way  in  Dewey  and  Mead,  can  be  set  in
continuity with the evolutionistic  theses of  the above-mentioned essay and they will
often overlook the developments of thought of the last James, of a philosopher that is,
more and more ‘infatuated of metaphysics.’
46 Really, the position of James is complex, divided and almost working on antithetical or at
least hardly compatible plane. Nevertheless, what seems to have surely fascinated James
since the years of The Will to Believe – but in a more evident way when he composed the
Essays on Radical Empiricism – was the possibility to mediate truth and pluralism through
the appeal to a sort of  principle  of  individuality,  grounded in the creativeness and the
originality of every human being. To the concept of truth as ‘verification,’ he replaces in
The  Will  to  Believe  one  new,  that  does  not  draw  its  value  only  from  its  practical
effectiveness, but keeps the free will in the effectiveness of intimate and deep fields of
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experience, inaccessible to the scientific knowledge, that can be cultured only through a
taking of conscience of fideistic nature.
New  men  and  women,  books,  accidents,  events,  inventions,  enterprises,  burst
unceasingly upon the world. It is vain to resolve these into ancient elements, or to
say  that  they  belong  to  ancient  kind,  so  long  as  no  one  of  them  in  its  full
individuality ever was here before or will  ever come again.  Men of  science and
philosophy,  the  moment  they  forget  their  theoretic  abstractions,  live  in  their
biographies as much as any one else, and believe as naively that that fact even now
is making, and that they themselves, by doing “original work,” help to determine
what the future shall become.53
47 Individuality,  both  as  principle  of  cosmological  order,  both  in  its  ethical  meaning,
constitutes  a  line of  union among two philosophies,  pragmatism and spiritualism,  so
different for methods and finality.
48 The philosophies of Bergson and James, departed from that sort of unusual coincidence
we referred to, developed two philosophical theories in which, also assuming a different
conception of the evolutionary movement, the psychic component and the physic one are
harmoniously penetrated. Both the philosophers, after having crossed two distinct and
separate  walk,  reach the  formulation of  an  ethics  that  is  inspired to  be  one  with  a
common individualistic matrix. For the two thinkers, the ethical principles stop being
empty rules and become direct expression of the real life of single personalities.
49 The lesson of  deep trust  in the value of  the individual  personality  acknowledged by
Bergson and James has a common ‘idealistic’ and ‘romantic’ derivation from Emersonian
Transcendentalism. As a matter of fact, if Emerson’s thought played an important and
well recognized role in the development of American pragmatism, his role over other
philosophical European contexts was even more direct and incisive. Is this also the case of
Bergson’s  first  approach  to  American  philosophy.  Also  on  this  circumstance  the
adventures  of  Emerson’s  seminal  ideas  carried  out  a  journey  to/from  Europe  whose
‘rebound effect’ on the American context is useful to evaluate.
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ABSTRACTS
Emerson’s  thought  played  an  important  and  well  recognized  role  in  the  development  of
American pragmatism, but the role exerted by the Transcendentalist in some other philosophical
European contexts was even more direct and incisive. On some circumstances, the “adventure”
of Emerson’s seminal ideas carried out a journey to/from Europe whose “rebound effect” on the
American context is useful to evaluate. The widely attested influence of Emerson on Nietzsche
sets an expressive example of this outward/inwards journey; other plain indications suggest now
to  reconsider  the  Emerson-Bergson  relation  and  the  peculiar  outcomes  that  this  relation
produced in James’ pragmatism. In this paper, the controversy between William James and Henri
Bergson is considered as from the topic of individuality and the very similar way in which the
two philosophers theorized its temporalistic and pluralistic constitution. Both of them have been
deeply influenced by Emerson, even though in different measure and sometimes with different –
if not diverging – philosophical results. Nevertheless, just their common reference to Emerson
can contribute to a better understanding of their controversial relation and of the consequences
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